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ABSTRACT
For every new product launched, there are many major existing firms who
wish to defend their product's profitability from the new product attack.
This essay summarizes research on defensive marketing strategy, that is, the
adjustment of price, advertising, image, ingredients, distribution and other
marketing mix elements in order to maintain maximum profitability and
strategic position.
First, a marketing science model of consumer behavior is presented and
interpreted relative to an applied economics perspective. This model
implies qualitative results which suggest directional changes in price,
advertising, product ingredients, and distribution. Next, measurement and
estimation of the consumer model are discussed and an empirical application
presented. Included are vignettes on seven world-wide applications.
The focus throughout this essay is on the strengths and weaknesses of
the research and applications to date and on the opportunities for further
research by both applied economists and marketing scientists.
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1. PERSPECTIVE
My perspective is that of a marketing scientist. My goal is to study
marketing phenomena and to develop theory and methodology which helps managers
better understand the environment in which they operate in order to use
marketing strategies proactively to maximize profit. The research summarized
in this essay is defensive strategy, or more simply, how to achieve the best
profit position when a competitive new product enters a market in which a
defending firm now has a profitable product.
This problem is perceived as critically important to a large group of
marketing managers, division managers, and CEO's. Each year, over 1,000 new
products are launched in the consumer sector and many times that number in the
industrial sector. Many are minor innovations of little impact, but
significant numbers are threats to highly profitable businesses.
For example, consider the new analgesic products, Advil (American Home
Products) and Nuprin (Bristol-Myers), based on the drug ibuprofen which became
available over-the-counter in May, 1984. Both entries have the potential to
impact substantially the dominant share and profitability of Johnson &
Johnson's Tylenol brand, which is based on another drug, acetominophen. (The
analgesic category accounts for almost 1.5 billion in annual sales.) Johnson
& Johnson can counter with changes in price, coupons, price-off deals,
advertising budgets, advertising message, in-store promotions, trade deals,
sales calls on doctors, new acetominophen products, or even a new ibuprofen
brand when it comes off patent next year. But which combination of these
marketing strategies is most effective and what level of investment
[disinvestment) in each strategy will lead to maximm (after attack) profit?
Or, as a brand manager once told me, "Should we bomb them back to the stone
ages or just hope they'll go away?'
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In the past four years, we have made some initial progress in addressing
this problem. This progress is summarized in three published papers (Hauser
and Simmie, 1981; Hauser and Shugan, 1983; and Hauser and Gaskin, 1984) as
well as seven confidential applications in the U. S. and Japan. I hope in
this essay to give you an overview of what we have learned about the problem.
In doing so,. you will also see what we do not know and would like to
understand. Because our perspective is marketing science, I believe we bring
unique strengths to the study of this problem. I also believe that, as
applied economists, your unique strengths will add new insight and new
approaches to the study of defensive strategy.
2. CONSUMIE MODEL
The theory upon which defensive marketing strategy is based is an analytic
model of how consumers respond to marketing strategies. This model has
evolved based on over fifteen years of empirical and theoretical research in
marketing science. Each assumption is based firmly on empirically documented
generalizations of consumer behavior. While it is used here for defensive
strategy, it applies also to many other strategic issues. You will recognize
many components as quite similar to economic models of consumer behavior.
However, there are other components with which you may be uncomfortable.
Because our goal is marketing science, we have chosen initially to stress
certain phenomena that are relevant to marketing decisions. As our knowledge
advances, we will add richness in other phenomena.
In this section, I present the intuition behind each assumption. The
formal mathematics are in Hauser and Shugan (1983).
Product Image. It is common in marketing practice and theory to
represent products by how consumers perceive them in a multidimensional
space. For example, Figure 1 is a representation of brand images in the
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analgesics market, circa early-1970's. In this "perceptual map", Tylenol has
a unique position' because consumers perceive it to have fewer side effects,
such as stomach upset, than the aspirin-based products, Bayer, Anacin, and
Excedrin. A number of comments about the map are relevant.
Gentleness
per Dollar
* Tylenol
*Bayer
* Anacin
*Excedrin
Effectiveness per Dollar
FIGURE 1: Illustrative Perceptual Map
First, the map represents the market from the consumer's perspective,
that is, the consumer's subjective reality. The objective reality of the
physical ingredients, such as the fact that acetominophen (Tylenol) does not
upset the stomach as much as aspirin, influences subjective reality, but so
does advertising, package design, social influence and other variables. The
sap summarizes the impact of the actual product and some important marketing
strategies. The evidence for and the implications of such a map as compared
to a traditional applied economics physical characteristic map (a la
Lancaster, 1971) are summarized in Hauser and Simmie (1981).
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Second, the map represents products "per dollar". Such scaling is
familiar to economists, e.g., Lancaster (1971), and can be readily extended to
perceptual space by postulating a mapping from physical characteristics (and
psycho-social cues) to perceptions. But the Lancasterian framework is
sufficient, not necessary. For example, Figure 1 also results if the "goods"
utility function is weakly separable (Blackorby, Primont and Russell, 1975),
preference for analgesics is linear in 'gentleness' and 'effectiveness', and
we focus on market share. Analytically, we use "per dollar" scaling to
incorporate price (and budget constraints) explicitly into the map. In
reality, "per dollar" scaling is an approximation, but one that seems to be
reasonable empirically (Hauser and Gaskin, 1984; Hauser and Urban, 1984).
Finally, the map in Figure 1 assumes consumers are homogeneous in their
perceptions of products. Empirically, different consumers perceive products
differently, but such heterogeneity of perceptions can be summarized by
multivariate normal distributions. In most cases, it is practical to use the
centroid of the distribution as the map position and fold heterogeneity into
consumer tastes. See Hauser and Simmie (1981) and Section 7 of this paper for
models with heterogeneous perceptions.
Consumer Choice. Assume for a moment that consumers are aware of all
four products in Figure 1, know the map positions, and find these products to
be available. Behavioral science and market research practice suggest that in
perceptual space, it is quite reasonable to approximate preference tradeoffs
as linear. (In other words, non-linear indifference curves in characteristics
space become approximately linear in perceptual space.)
We assume consumers vary in their tastes, i.e., trade-offs among
'effectiveness' and 'gentleness', and, since trade-offs are linear, we
represent each consumer's tastes by the angle their indifference curve makes
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with the vertical
Tylenol, consumer
choose Excedrin.
between a 2 and a3
axis. As shown in Figure 2a, consumer 1 (900) will choose
2 (600) will choose Bayer, and consumer 3 (0°) will
As shown in Figure 2b, all consumers with taste angles
will choose Bayer.
Consumer 1 (a 900)
Tylenol
2 (a - 600)
£nac.n 
Excedrin
Consumer
(a = 00)
3
E/$ E/$
a) Varying Tastes b) Consumers ho Choose Bayer
FIGURE 2: Preference Tradeoffs Imply Choice
Finally, as shown in Figure 3, the market share of Bayer is simply the
area under the taste distribution, f(a), between a 2 and a3. The
market share of Tylenol is the area between a3 and 90 .1
Three comments are in order. First, we have focused on market share.
This assumes that the impact of a price change on category volume is small
xelative to the impact on share. For large price changes we must extend the
model to category volume.
1For example, for uniformly distributed tastes, the market share of
Bayer is simply (a 3-a 2)/900 .
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f(a)
00 a2 a3 Q 0
°0 - EFFECTIVENESS GENTLENESS _
FIGURE 3: Distribution of Consumer Tastes
Second, the analytic mechanism of using polar coordinates, a, for
tastes is powerful because (1) the domain of tastes is closed and bounded,
(2) the interpretation is symmetric in the two taste dimensions, and (3) the
expression for market share, j3 f(a) da, is analytically tractable.
a 2
Finally, we can easily extend this model to three or more perceptual
dimensions by defining the appropriate taste angles, see Hauser and Gaskin
(1984).
Informatiot. In a typical product category, a consumer usually has
good information on only a small fraction of the available products. (Of
*the 164 makes of automobiles, how many can you evaluate? Of the more than
25 deodorant brands, how many can you even name?) This phenomena is
well-documented, e.g., Silk and Urban (1978) and quite prevalent in
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marketing models. We call the set of products a consumer can evaluate his
"evoked set." For example, for four analgesic products, there are 15
possible non-null evoked sets including {Tylenol, Bayer, Anacin,
Excedrin}, iTylenol, Bayer}, {Tylenol), etc.
We also allow consumers to be heterogeneous in their information, i.e.,
evoked sets. Thus, if S is the proportion of consumers using evoked
set , f (a) is the taste distribution of consumers using evoked set
i, and A are the angles favoring a product, say Bayer, for evoked set
Q, then the market share of that product, Bayer, is simply:
iZ Je IA fi(a) da (1)
Note that advertising, distribution, and other marketing strategies impact
information by changing the evoked set probabilities, S.
Advertising. Advertising has two main effects, awareness and
repositioning. "Share of voice", i.e., total advertising spending, has a
major impact on influencing consumers to consider a product. We model this
impact as increasing the evoked set probabilities, S, for those evoked
sets containing the product. The usual assumption is decreasing marginal
returns, i.e., that S is a non-decreasing and concave function of
advertising spending.
The advertising message, its copy'", has a major impact on the product's
position in perceptual space. Changing a product's position influences the
share of taste angles favoring a product, JA f(a) d, and, hence, the
market share. Again, we normally assume that a product's position, along a
dimension, say 'effectiveness', is a non-decreasing and concave function of
advertising spending allocated to stressing 'effectiveness'.
By separating advertising into its components we can analyze both the
magnitude and the message of advertising. Implicit in this model is a focus
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on long-run strategy (we allow S to rise and fall as a function of
long-run advertising investment). To analyze short run strategy, we need to
add carry-over effects, lagged effects, and other dynamic phenomena. See,
for example, Little (1979).
Product Quality. Quality is just a single dimension of consumers'
perceptions, e.g., 'effectiveness', or a combination of the dimensions.
Production Cost. Investments in production or improved ingredients
affect the physical characteristics of a product and hence its perceived
position. Again, we assume a product's position is a non-decreasing and
concave function of production costs. When necessary, we separate
production cost into components corresponding to each perceptual dimension.
In Hauser and Shugan (1983), we assume constant returns to scale for
analytic simplicity. The assumption of constant returns is sufficient but
not necessary to obtain our results. This is one area of potential research.
Product Ingredients and Features. These affect a product's position.
For example, adding caffeine to aspirin (as in Anacin) increases its
perceived 'effectiveness'. Even in automobiles, features such as cruise
control and air conditioning or quality control such as fit and finish"
have been modeled empirically as impacting an automobile's perceived
position.
Price. Because a product is represented by its position in "per
dollar' perceptual space, a change in price moves a product in that
space.2 Because a product's position affects share through equation (1),
this price effect is highly non-linear, but tractable. 3 As
2Specifically, a price decrease (increase) moves a product out (in) along
a ray connecting a product to the origin.
3Even for uniformly distributed tastes, where ff(a) da -
(a3-a2)/900, the boundary angles, a2 and a3, are related by
an arctan function to ratios of the differences between Tylenol, Bayer, and
Anacin's positions.
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discussed above, this approximation in price response can be relaxed in
future research.
Distribution. One result of investment in the channel of distribution
is increased availability, and, hence, evoking, of a product. This
component of distribution affects the evoked set probabilitities, S.
We can also model other aspects of distribution by their impacts on a
product's position or its price.
Promotion. We have not yet analyzed the impact of promotion
analytically, but in our empirical applications, we approximate long-term
promotion effects as temporary price decreases. We use equation (1) to
compute the market share at full price and separately to compute the market
share when the product is on promotion. Long-term share is a weighted
combination of the two shares.
This completes the brief discussion of the consumer model. Each
assumption is well-documented empirically (see Hauser and Simmie 1981, and
Hauser and Shugan 1983 for references), but we have obtained marketing
richness at some sacrifice. In particular, we assume constant returns to
scale, approximate price by its effect on a product's "per dollar" position,
and focus on share. Despite these tradeoffs, I hope you find this model
interesting and I hope you choose to investigate the implications of
relaxing these assumptions.
I now use the model to interpret a historical case of defensive
marketing and then turn to the theoretical implications of the consumer
model.
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3. A SIMPLIFIED HISTORICAL CASE: TYLENOL vsw. DATRIL
The histogram in figure 3 represents the market share of Tylenol when
every consumer evokes every product in the perceptual map. When evoked set
effects are considered, equation (1) causes us to modify the histogram in
figure 3. For example, for the evoked set, {Tylenol, Excedrin), Tylenol
will capture all consumers who have tastes between 45°0 and 900°, rather
than all consumers between 60° and 90°. For the evoked set,
{Tylenol), Tylenol will capture all consumers. When we sum together
Tylenol's shares of the f (a)'s, we are likely to get a region of
f(a) that is large for taste angles favoring gentleness but tapers off
more slowly than that shown in Figure 3. Figure 4 is one such
representation of Tylenol's consumers.
f(a)
-* -EFFECTIVENESS GENTLNESS
FIGURE 4: Consumers Who Favor Tylenol When We Consider Evoked
Set (Information) Effects
In the early 1970's, Tylenol had a reasonable share of the market even
though it was not nationally advertised. (Its awareness come from doctor's
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recommendations which in turn were strongly influenced by McNeil
Laboratories', a division of Johnson & Johnson, "detail" force.) 4
Recognizing the opportunity for competition along 'gentleness', Bristol-
Myers introduced an acetominophen based product, Datril, nationally
advertised as "just as good as Tylenol, only cheaper". Such a positioning
puts them on the map as shown in Figure 5a.
f(a)
Tylenol
(before attack)
· Bayer
a) Datril's attack
--- Effectiveness Gentleness _
b) Effect on consumers
FIGURE 5: Interpretation of Tylenol - Datril Case
Datril now has the potential to impact Tylenol's share dramatically.
Even national advertising would not reach all of Tylenol's consumers, but it
will reach some Bayer, Anacin, and Excedrin consumers. Furthermore, Datril
is now positioned better than Tylenol to compete with Bayer, Anacin, and
4A detail force is a salesforce that calls on doctors to make them
aware of a drug, stress its benefits, and encourage them to recommend it to
consumers.
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Excedrin. Had Tylenol done nothing, Datril might have captured the area
shown in Figure 5b.
In top level strategy meetings, Johnson & Johnson decided to fight back
strongly. Literally over a weekend, they mobilized the Johnson & Johnson
salesforce (not just the McNeil division's salesforce), matched Datril's
price, persuaded the television networks that Datril's price advantage was
now false advertising, and began other defensive measures. The result was
that Tylenol, with its strong image from years of detailing, leap-frogged
Datril and successfully trumped Bristol-Myer's challenge.
Awakened to the potential of the Tylenol brand, McNeil Laboratories
became a national advertiser, added the Extra Strength Tylenol brand to
capture consumers interested in 'effectiveness', and undertook a number of
effective marketing stragtegies. Until the current ibuprofen challenge,
McNeil's marketing has been so strong that identical physical products,
Datril, Panadol, and generic acetominophen, have not been able to draw
substantial share from Tylenol. Tylenol was even able to weather a tragic
poisoning incident in 1982.
4. THEOKY: THE BEST DEFENSE
Tylenol's price decrease was a successful defense. We wondered if this
generalized and, if so, under what conditions. Based on the consumer model
of Section 2, Steven Shugan, of the University of Chicago, and I published
fourteen theorems to summarize the qualitative implications for the best
defense. We assumed the defending firm was behaving rationally before the
attack (maximizing long-term profit) and that they would react to achieve
the best profit available after the attack. We were concerned with how
aarketing strategy would change as the result of the attack.
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Our equilibrium assumption is simple. We assume the attacker enters
with perfect foresight as to the defender's reaction and we focus on the
primary defender by holding all other firms' strategies constant. In other
words, we analyze a two product equilibrium against the background of a more
complex, but static, market.
Clearly, more complex equilibria assumptions are potentially interesting
and deserve investigation, but we believe this simple assumption is a useful
first-step and intuitive arguments (Section 8 of Hauser and Shugan, 1983)
suggest that other firms' reactions reinforce the derived qualitative
results. Research is now underway using methodologies pioneered by Axelrod
and Hamilton (1980) for generic competitive strategies, but we have yet to
use analytically the consumer model of Section 2 to derive explicit results
for alternative assumptions about equilibrium. Perhaps, I can entice you to
do so.
Price Strategy.
Price affects profit through its impact on a brand's position in
perceptual space and its impact on the profit margin. A price decrease
causes the former to increase causing, in turn, market share to increase,
but this is, of course, countered by a decrease in margin.
We first analyze the case of uniformly distributed tastes [f(a) -
1/900 for ac[OO, 9001). We show that the effect of price on share
is stronger than its affect on margin for defensive scenarios. In
particular:5
RESULT 1. If consrmer tastes are umiforuly distributed, then
profits after the attack can be increased by lowering price from
its before attack level.
5Formal proofs of all results are in the appendix to Hauser and
Shugan, 1983. All results are for two perceptual dimensions.
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The result requires a technical condition which we call "regular markets",
but extensive simulation suggests the result generalizes to irregular
markets. We also show the result generalizes to certain other
distributions, for example, the result generalizes for distributions
satisfying f'(a) < 0 for cases where the attacking product is to the
upper left of the defending product and f'(a) > 0 for cases when the
attacking product is on the lower right of the defending product.
Interestingly, the result does not hold for all taste distributions. In
particular:
RESULT 2. There exist distributions of consumer tastes for which
the best defensive price requires a price increase.
Examples are actually easy to create with multimodal distributions.
Intuitively, we can interpret each mode of a probability distribution for
tastes as a "market segment". Then, a brand's position gives it something
akin to a local monopoly. If the taste distribution is such that (1) before
entry, it pays for the defender to have a low price to compete in more than
one market segment; and (2) the attacker out positions the defender in one
market segment but not in others, then, after attack, it may pay the
defender to raise price and, in effect, exploit the local monopolies not
under attack.
Results 1 and 2 are derived explicitly for a full information market,
but we also show that:6
RESULT 3. The best defensive pricing strategy is independent of
the best defensive distribution (availability) strategy and the
best defensive awareness advertising strategy, but the best
defensive distribution and awareness advertlsing strategies depend
upon the price decision.
6The result (Theorem 6) is explicit for distribution, but readily
extended to awareness advertising. See Hauser and Shugan, pages 337 and 341.
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In other words, to the extent that distribution affects availability and
advertising affects awareness, Results 1 and 2 are not affected by these
variables. Result 3 suggests that price is a key strategic defensive
variable and may need to be set at high levels in the organization.
Finally, we show that:7
Result 4. If market size does not increase dramatically, optimal
defensive profits must decrease if a new brand enters
competitively, regardless of defensive price, distribution and
awareness advertising strategy.
Result 4 is obvious intuitively if we simply consider the argument that "if
we can increase profits after the attack, when the market is more
competitive, why did we not do so before the attack?". But Result 4 is
important because it cautions us that there may exist strategies in which it
is best to prevent a competitor from getting a foothold in a market because
once he is in you lose profits. Effectively, Tylenol's historical defensive
strategy kept Datril from establishing a "beachhead" in the market for
analgesics.
In summary, if the market is unsegmented (uniform distribution of
tastes), it pays to lower price as a defensive measure. But, there are
cases such as highly segmented markets where a price increase is best.
Furthermore, price is a key strategic variable that affects, but is not
affected by, decisions on defensive distribution and awareness advertising.
Finally, even the best defensive strategy can not maintain profits at the
level attained prior to the attack.
Distribution. 
In marketing theory, the channel of distribution (wholesalers,
distributers, jobbers, retailers, etc.) perform valuable and complex roles
7Result 4 is proved explicitly for availability, but easily extended
to awareness. I have added the word dramatically' even though it does not
appear in the original theorem. We prove the theorem for "no market size
increase". However, "no increase" is sufficient, not necessary.
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including, but not limited to, information, persuasion, service, financing,
image maintainance, and delivery, as well as participating in negotiations
on price. We focus here on one important aspect of that role, making the
product available to the consumer. In particular, we examine the
availability that can be obtained by investment in distribution. For
availability, it is easy to show:
RESULT 5. If the market size does not increase dramatically as
the result of the new competitor, the best defensive distribution
strategy is to decrease spending on distribution.
Many people find this result counterintuitive. But the intuition is
simple if you think of marginal revenue and marginal cost. Result 5 says
that the competitive new product has made the market less profitable (see
Result 4), hence, the marginal profit for marginal "retailers" is less. If
the marginal cost has not changed for persuading these retailers to make the
product available, it no longer makes economic sense to invest in those
marginal retailers.
Result 5 applies equally well to a multiplicative distribution index
such as the common response analysis assumptions prevelant in marketing
theory (e.g., Little, 1979) and, if the brand is sold in several markets,
Result 5 holds for each market. Result 5 is also symmetric for competitive
withdrawals. For example, if a newspaper withdraws from the market as did
the Chicago Daily News in the late-1970's, it makes economic sense to
increase investment to capture your former competitor's channel of
distribution. Indeed, both the Chicago Tribune and Chicago Sun Times fought
competitively for the Daily News' subscribers, newsboys, etc.
Product Improveient
We model product improvement as movements in the perceptual map. For
example, consider an upper adjacent" attack as illustrated in Figure 6. We
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call the attack "upper adjacent" because the new product is above the
defending brand and between the defending brand and its closet competitor.
We assume the defender can improve its image by improving its physical
product. Of course, such movements increase production cost and may or may
not be profitable.
We model movements, such as illustrated by the dotted line in Figure 6,
by breaking those movements into their orthogonal components. For upper
adjacent attacks, we call improvements along dimension 1, improvements "away
from the attack". (Solid line in Figure 6.) Improvements along dimension 2
are "toward the attack". (Dashed line in Figure 6.) In reality, it is rare
that a brand can move independently along just one dimension, but we gain
valuable insight into the net movement (dotted line) by analyzing each
component separately.
Dimension 2
$
A
B 
* New Product
I . -
Defender { '
*C
Dimension 1/$
FIGURE 6: Defender's Options Under an Upper Adjacent Attack
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It may be possible to obtain global results, but to date we have been
only able to obtain clear results "at the margin", that is, for product
improvements holding price and other variables constant. In particular:
RESULT 6. If consumer tastes are uniformly distributed and the
competitive brand attacks along attribute 2, (i.e., an upper
adjacent attack), then, at the margin,
(a) profits are increasing for product improvements 'away from the
attack' (along the defender's strength, dimension 1); and,
(b) under certain conditions, profits are increasing for product
improvements 'toward the attack' (along the attacker's
strength, dimension 2).
The technical conditions for part (b) are given in Hauser and Shugan (1983,
Theorem 9). They are interpretable, but not easily. Of course, symmetric
results hold for attacks along dimension 1, i.e., lower adjacent attacks,
and Result 6 can be extended to other distributions of consumer tastes. We
interpret negative movements along either dimension as substituting less
costly, lower quality ingredients.
Result 6 turns out to be very useful in practice. In our experience to
date, the defending product had obtained its share by being the dominant
brand on a key dimension, say brands A or C in Figure 6. Most likely, due
to first entrant advantages, it appears the attacking products do not choose
a parity position, but rather an upper or lower adjacent attack. Result 6
gives the unambiguous result (for uniformly distributed tastes) that
movements to the defending brands strengths pay off. Countermoves must be
analyzed more carefully.
Advertisins.
A moments reflection reveals that awareness advertising is analogous to
'availability while repositioning advertising is analogous to product
improvements. Here we assume that, before the attack, some level of
positioning advertising is required to maintain a product's image for
optimal profit. Movements along each component dimension represent
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different advertising themes, e.g., 'effectiveness' or 'gentleness'.
Movements such as the dotted line in Figure 6 are mixed themes of varying
emphasis.- Decreases in a component dimension are interpreted as less
spending, not as themes designed to lower perceptions.
Because of the analogies to distribution and product improvement, it is
not surprising that we were able to prove:
Result 7. If the market size does not increase dramatically as
the result of the new competitor, the best advertising strategy
includes decreasing the budget for awareness advertising.
Result 8. If consumer tastes are uniformly distributed and the
competitive brand attacks along attribute 2 (i.e., an upper
adjacent attack), then, at the margin,
(a) profits are increasing in repositioning spending along the
defender's strengths, attribute 1; and,
(b) under certain conditions, profits are increasing in
repositioning spending along the attacker's strengths,
attribute 2.
Result 8 is a directional result at the margin, but, for unsegmented
markets, Results 7 and 8 combine to give usable qualitative insight on
defensive advertising. Together, these results suggest that repositioning
advertising is a more effective defensive strategy than advertising that
simply informs the consumer about the brand. For example, Tylenol's
defensive advertising should favor advertising copy that stresses gentleness
rather than copy that stresses Tylenol's name.
suwoT.
The eight qualitative results summarized above are a first step toward
understanding which defensive actions are most effective. Together, they
suggest the directions of change in a defender's marketing variables.
In particular:
* distribution and awareness advertising should be decreased;
* price strategies are independent of distribution and awareness
advertising strategies but not vice versa; and,
* profits always decrease as the result of a new competitive brand.
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If consumer tastes are uniformly distributed, at the margin, defensive
profits are
* increasing for price decreases,
a increasing for product improvements along the defending brand's
relative strengths, and,
* increasing for increases in repositioning advertising along the
defending brand's relative strengths.
Also, there are cases, e.g., some highly segmented markets, where price
increases may be optimal.
5. MEASUREMENT AND ESTIMATION
General qualitative insights are valuable, but marketing managers also
want more specific advice. To provide such prescriptions for defensive
action we have had to develop practical measurement and estimation
techniques for the key components of the consumer model:
* the "per dollar" perceptual map,
* the consumer taste distribition, and,
· the appropriate response functions.
"Per Dollar" Perceptual aps.
Measurement of consumer perceptions is a well-developed art in marketing
and is summarized in many textbooks including my own (with Glen Urban of
M.I.T.) on new product development. See Urban and Hauser (1980).
Because much of my applied research incorporates perceptual maps, I once
undertook an empirical comparison of the predictive ability of alternative
perceptual mapping techniques (Hauser and Koppelman, 1979). Empirically,
the best technique seems to be direct measurement in which:
* twenty or so semantic scales are elicited from consumers via
qualitative research;
* consumers are asked to rate each product in their evoked set on
these scales;
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* after standardization of all ratings by individuals, the ratings
are factor analyzed where correlations are computed across subjects
and stimuli; and,
* map positions are approximated by average factor scores for the
brands on each factor dimension.
Factor analytic techniques appear superior empirically to similarity scaling
and discriminant analysis of attribute ratings. The raw semantic scales
themselves are too highly correlated to be useful. Typically, there are two
to four factor dimensions.
Theoretically, factor scores are at best interval scales, but "per
dollar" maps require ratio scaled data. Hence, "per dollar" maps are quite
controversial in marketing with many researchers believing that "per dollar"
maps are infeasible to measure and may not even exist. In practice, we have
found that consumers appear to anchor their perceptions on the worst brand
along each dimension, hence, if we compute scores relative to the worst
brand, the resulting map positions act as if they were ratio scales.
Initial evidence is published in Hauser and Gaskin (1984) but more work
needs to be done.
Consumer Taste Distribution.
Standard economic techniques for consumer tastes, such as logit
analysis, probit analysis, and ordinary least squares, implicitly assume
unimodal taste distributions: double-exponential, normal, and normal,
respectively. For many situations in marketing science these techniques are
quite powerful; however, for defensive strategies, our qualitative results
suggest that we need greater flexibility in estimating the consumer taste
distribution. Restriction to a unimodal taste distribution could miss, for
example, the complexities of price strategies (Results 1 and 2).
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We turn instead to the revealed preference technique illustrated in
Figure 7. In figure 7, we focus on a single evoked set, {A, B, C}, in
which the market shares in the evoked set are 30%, 20% and 50%,
respectively. For that evoked set, the relative perceptual dimensions are
such that all consumers with taste angles between 00 and 300 choose
brand C, those between 300 and 600 choose brand B, and those between
600 and 900 choose brand A. Because 50% of the consumers choose brand
C, we know 50% have taste angles between 00 and 300. Similarly, 20%
have taste angles between 30° and 60° and 30Z between 60° and 90°.
EVOKED SET = (A, B, C}
Dimension 2
A
C
Consumer Taste Distribution
,-Dimension 1 Dimension 2 
C's market
share = 50%
B's Market
share = 20%
A's market
share = 30%
Dimenion 1/$ 0 30 60° 90
, FIGURE 7: Revealed Shape of Taste Distribution for a Single Evoked Set
(Using Piece-Wise Uniform Approximation)
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There are infinitely many probability density functions (pdf) consistent
with these market shares; for a single evoked set, we cannot distinguish
among them. In the interest of parsimony, we choose the piecewise uniform
pdf illustrated in Figure 7. Fortunately, for most markets, there are many
evoked sets possible; 15 for a four product market, 31 for a five product
market, etc. To describe the market level pdf we use a weighted sum of
evoked set level pdf's.8
Clearly, as the number of products in the market increases, the
estimated pdf converges to the true pdf. Empirically, we have found this
technique to produce reasonable pdf's which appear to predict the new brand
shares quite well. See predictive tests in Hauser and Gaskin (1984).
Response Functions.
The full model requires three types of response functions:
* awareness and availability as a function of dollar spending;
* product position as a function of features and or ingredients; and,
* product position as a function of advertising spending on
alternative messages.
The first two types are well-developed, the third type requires research.
Awareness and availability response functions are estimated by a variety
of standard techniques including experiments, econometrics, and judgment.
See review in Little (1979).
Response functions producing preference as a function of product
features require a standard marketing research technique, known as conjoint
analysis, in which consumers rank or rate factorial designs of product
profiles. See review in Green and Srinivasan (1978). It is quite easy to
adapt conjoint analysis to product positions. When costs of feature
profiles are established, we have the needed mapping from production cost to
8For singleton evoked sets, we use triangle distributions sloping
toward the single product's strength.
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product position. See examples for telecommunications products in Hauser
and Simmie (1981) and for educational services in Urban and Hauser (1980,
chapter 10).
6. AN EMPIRICAL EXAMPLE
The "DEFENDER" model has been applied seven times to date. I report
here our first application. Details are contained in Hauser and Gaskin
(1984).
Our first application was to a product category with well over $100
million in annual sales. There were three major brands in the category plus
generic store brands. The defending brand had a dominant position on one of
three perceptual dimensions and held a 41Z share of the market. Based on
the product benefit claims of the new competitive product, the attacker, it
appeared that the attacker was attempting to appeal directly to the
defender's customers.
For confidentiality, we disguise the three perceptual dimensions as
'professional quality', 'effective control', and 'ease of use'. Since the
defender had its strength on 'professional quality' we call it "Pro-Strip".
We call the attacker, "Attack", the other brands, Cata-Kill" and
"Tree-Guard", and the generic and private label products, Store Brand".
All other details are as they occurred.
Descriptive Analysis.
The map positions are shown in Figure 8. Notice that "Attack" is
definitely attempting to appeal to Pro-Strip's' customers by positioning
strongly on 'professional quality', but better than "Pro-Strip" on
'effective control' and 'ease of use'. However, "Attack' did not match
"Pro-Strip's" 'professional quality' appeal. Both Pro-Strip' and Attack"
are premium products with prices 2.8 times Store Brand", compared to
"Cata-Kill" and Tree-Guard", with prices 1.3 and 1.2 times "Store Brand",
respectively.
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FIGURE 8: Perceptual Map for Empirical Example (Disguised Brand Names)
[From Hauser and Gaskin, 1984.]
The consumer taste distribution is shown in Figure 9a. Since we have
three perceptual dimensions, we need two taste angles representing,
respectively, trade-offs among 'effective control' and 'ease of use' and
among 'effective control' and 'professional quality'. Figure 9a suggests
that trade-offs among 'effective control' and 'ease of use' are
approximately uniformly distributed while trade-offs among 'effective
ontrol' and 'professional quality' slope upward toward 'professional
quality' with a tower at extreme emphasis on 'professional quality'. This
tower represents a market segment of consumers who demand 'professional
quality' and are willing to sacrifice 'effective contrtol' and 'ease of use'
to get it.
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a) Consumer taste distribution
Share of
f(c,B)
c) Attack's share
b) Pro-Strip's share before Attack
Sha:
f(c
d) Pro-Strip's share after Attack
d) Pro-Strip's share after Attac k
FIGURE 9: Consumer Taste Distribution and Shares for "Pro-Strip" and "Attack"
(Disguised Brand Names) [from Hauser and Gaskin, 1984.1
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Figure 9b shows those consumers who chose "Pro-Strip". As expected,
"Pro-Strip" captures the 'professional quality' segment and gets most of its
business from that segment. Because they are the major advertiser in the
category, Pro-Strip' does well in many evoked sets and, hence, also
captures some less extreme customers. The customers of the other products
are not shown explicitly, but "Cata-Kill" and Tree-Guard' capture more
central portions of the taste distribution and Store Brand" captures the
'ease of use' portion. (See details in Hauser and Gaskin, 1984.)
When Attack" enters the market, shares change. Assuming 100% awareness
and distribution (full evoking), we place "Attack" on the perceptual map and
compute its share of the taste distribution. In part, because "Attack"
cannot match Pro-Strip" on 'professional quality' it does not capture the
'professional quality' segment but instead the area shown in Figure 9c.
Figure 9d projects the effect on Pro-Strip" of "Attack" if it were to
obtain full evoking. "Attack" would hurt "Pro-Strip' by drawing from
"Pro-Strip" its more moderate customers. (At less than 100% evoking, we
scale down figure 9d by "Attack's" evoking percentage and forecast
'Pro-Strip's' share as a weighted combination of Figures 9b and 9d).
Based on Figure 9, "Pro-Strip's" defense is clear. To regain its share
and/or preempt "Attack" it must regain consumers with moderate taste
trade-offs. However, strategically, "Pro-Strip" must maintain a
'professional quality' image to preempt future attacks through reposi-
tionings by 'Attack".
Prescriptive Analysis.
We analyzed many defensive scenarios for Pro-Strip"; I illustrate here
;only the price analysis.
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To compute the price response, we first compute the effect of a change
in price on "Pro-Strip's" position, and use the new map and the estimated
taste distributions to compute "Pro-Strip's' new share. Using accounting
data on fixed and variable costs and response functions for advertising, we
(1) compute the optimal advertising budget and (2) the resulting annual
profit. Notice that "Attack's" position is held constant for this
exercise. In practice, we also analyze competitive response scenarios.
Because competitive costs are well-guarded secrets, full equilibrium
analysis cannot be run.
Profit ($mm)
5.0 -
4.0 -
3.0 -
2.0--
1.0-
0.0-
-1.0
_ 
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1
$1.80
N
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FIGURE 10: Profit and Market Share for "Pro-Strip" Prior to Entry of "Attack"
(Price is per unit in 1982 dollars. Profit is in 1982 dollars but
multiplied by a constant for confidentiality.)
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Figure 10 shows "Pro-Strip's" profit and market share as a function of
price (in 1982 dollars) prior to "Attack's" entry. Remember, each point in
Figure 10ois the result of an optimization on other marketing variables.
Profit rises rapidly as price increases until about 1.67, at which
point it levels off until about 1.88. In this range, increases in margin
roughly cancel decreases in market share. The rise again after $1.88 is the
result of exploiting the 'professional quality' segment and is viewed as an
unacceptable option for "Pro-Strip". Since long-run strategy represents a
trade-off among annual profit and market share and since Figure 10 is an
estimate,9 not exact values, Pro-Strip" was using 1.69 as its average
price.
Based on "Attack's" entry, we recompute profit and share as shown in
Figure 11. "Pro-Strip's" share is now more sensitive to price. If the
model's predictions are perfectly accurate, the best defensive price is just
under 1.69. When measurement error is taken into account, the most we can
say is that the best defensive price is in the range of $1.69.
Like many brand managers, the Pro-Strip" managers felt pressure to
react immediately and did so prior to the DEFENDER analysis. Their gut
reaction was to raise margins by 5 to compensate for the loss of share to
'Attack". Their rationale was to "protect the profitability of the brand".
Unfortunately, based on the model, this was not the best move. Had they
held price, they could have retained approximately 500,000 more in annual
profits and 3.4X more in market share. Had they dropped price to 1.59,
they could have retained the same profit as was retained at $1.74, but at a
9A price of 1.82 yields a slightly higher profit, but a much lower
share. Furthermore, the profit differences between price strategies of
$1.69 and $1.82 are not significant statistically.
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FIGURE 11: Profit and Market Share for "Pro-Strip" After the Entry of "Attack"
market share level 6.3 points higher. After our analysis, they moved price
back toward $1.69.
Other Applications.
In a second application (to another 100 million cateogry) with the same
firm, we were able to determine that the defending firm should not launch a
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defensive product line extension, but rather match the attacker's price cuts
and move to maintain dominance on dimension 1.
In an-application to a U.S. firm in OTC drugs, we analyzed potential
attacks. Our analysis helped the firm prepare for future attacks and,
serendipitously, identified a new product opportunity.
In another U.S. OTC application, we determined that the attack was not
now a threat, but could be in the future if the attacker lowered price by
30% and invested heavily in advertising. Since the competitor was committed
to the market, this was a very real threat. A number of alternative
scenarios were simulated, a monitoring system put in place, and defensive
plans developed.
In an application to decision support software, we were able to suggest
that a "mainframe' software firm move rapidly to develop micro compatibility.
In a Japanese application to a food category, the firm was not under
attack but expected multiple attacks in the near future. We simulated
profit and share for a variety of attacks to understand the defender's
vulnerability and suggest preemptive moves.
In another Japanese application, this time to a non-food catgegory, the
firm was under attack and expected new attacks. Its goal was to maintain
labor force employment and wanted to know what must be done to counter these
attacks. Interestingly, in this application the Osaka and Tokyo markets
were so different that we had to explicitly model both.
We are now undertaking and seeking new applications worldwide. With
enough experience we will develop valuable generalizations about the
behavior of firms in both defensive and attacking modes.
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7. WHERE DO WE GO FROH HERE?
This completes my brief summary of our research to date on defensive
marketing strategy. We feel we have made progress but we are humbled by the
questions left unanswered.
Current Projects.
Heterogeneous Perceptions. The model in Section 2 assumes
heterogeneous tastes but homogeneous perceptions. This is but an
approximation since perceptions, preferences and even choice rules are known
to be heterogeneous. In our applications, we have extended the model to
incorporate heterogeneous perceptions. Following ideas in Hauser and Simmie
(1981), we assume perceptions are distributed normally about their centroids
such that for any taste angle the probability of choosing a product is
given by a probit model. We then use a matrix extension 10 to the
procedure illustrated in Figure 7.
The matrix extension works well and has the theoretical advantage that a
brand can be inefficient on average in an evoked set, yet have non-zero
market share in the evoked set due to heterogeneity of perceptions. See
discussion in Hauser and Simmie (1981, pp. 42-44).
The Poker Game. Anyone with managerial experience quickly realizes
that competitive strategy is a real poker game with bluffs, gambles, and
10Divide the feasible tastes into J regions, each favoring a single
product. Let fp be the height of the uniform distribution in region p.
Let Cp be the angles in region p, let 6j(a) be the probability
product j is chosen for taste angle a and let d, [a1 Cp S (a) da.
Let MH be the observed market share of product 3. Then, the appropriate fitting
equation is djpf H for all or in matrix form DF - M.
When D is full rank, we save F - D-4 . There are empirical cases where
C is null causing D to be singular and there are empirical cases where one
o? more f 's are negative. We have developed modifications for these cases
using bragd specific constants. The method works just as well when a is a
vector.
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other complications. Our theorems and models provide guidance but do not
model this phenomena endogenously. Furthermore, simple equilibrium
assumptions such as the Cournot assumption just do not seem to capture the
flavor of managerial practice.
My colleagues and I are addressing this issue with a multifront research
agenda. (1) We are continuing applications to get a breadth of managerial
experience. (2) We are undertaking qualitative interviews with each major
player in key industries to determine what managers believe are their
decision strategies. (3) We are developing simplified competitive models
and sponsoring contests similar to the Axelrod and Hamilton (1981) iterated
prisoner's dilemma contest. And (4), we are hoping to develop analytical
models based on the consumer model in Section 2 under a variety of
equilibrium assumptions.
Revealed Image. Following standard marketing science paradigms, we
have chosen to measure perceptions directly and estimate the taste
distribution based on the measured perceptions and observed market shares
within evoked sets. The consumer model in Section 2 is quite flexible; we
can also estimate perceptions if (1) we assume a taste distribution, and (2)
observe market shares under a variety of price scenarios. See simple
example in Hauser and Shugan (1984, pp. 345-349). My colleague at the
University of Chicago, Steven Shugan, has applied these ideas to estimate
perceptual maps from weekly data on market share and price which was
obtained from automated supermarket checkouts. Although he assumes a
uniform distribution and is limited to two perceptual dimensions, his method
looks promising and produces perceptual maps with good face validity".
Future Directions.
Here are a few of the questions we hope to answer as we probe further
defensive marketing stragegy:
- 33 -
__I~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~- ...
* full n-product equilibrium, extending or challenging the results to
date,
* further understanding of the taste distributions which lead to
price decreases,
* qualitative analyses of temporary price reductions (deals),
* qualitative analyses of the dynamics of consumer response and
profit optimization,
* qualitative analyses of non-constant costs and/or costs leading to
entry barriers,
* qualitative analysis of how to enter a market with full foresight
on the defensive response of existing products,
* empirical studies of how firms do respond and whether they are
successful,
* inter-category or inter-divisional interactions, and
e many more.
You will note that many of these questions require applied economics
methodology. I hope you find them exciting.
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